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The Portable Sensor System: Addressing the Recognition Gap in 
Modern Surveillance Systems 
Brandon C. Sanders 
 
Introduction: Surveillance 
Ranges Of Surveillance 
Surveillance systems are composed of two components: an asset (i.e., platform) and the 
equipment (i.e., sensors) installed on it.1  The combination of the two determines how capable a 
system is at providing surveillance.  There are many ways to measure the surveillance capability 
of a system, some of which are: the ability of a system to detect items of interests (IOI) in 
lowlight; the maximum range at which an IOI can be detected; and how well an IOI can be 
detected when it is masked by thick foliage.  This paper focuses on the ranges of surveillance, 
one of which is the aforementioned maximum range of detection.  The other two ranges are the 
range of recognition and the tracking range.  The range of recognition is the maximum range at 
which a system can recognize an IOI, and, in most cases, the range at which that system can 
classify an IOI (e.g, a vehicle vs. a person).  For the sake of this paper, recognition is defined as 
surveillance that is capable of determining the intent of a specific IOI (e.g., smuggler vs. an 
illegal immigrant).  The final range, tracking, describes how far a system can track an IOI once it 
has been detected.  These ranges not only quantify the capabilities of a system, they also describe 
exactly what range-specific capabilities a surveillance system possesses.   
 
The Surveillance Envelope 
Describing the range-specific capabilities of a system is nothing more than a fancy way of 
discerning whether or not a surveillance system is capable of detection, recognition, and/or 
tracking.  For example, ground radars like ICx’s STS-1400 are capable of detecting and tracking 
IOIs while pressure plates (or any other type of unattended ground sensor or [UGS]) are only 
capable of detecting them.  The range-specific capabilities of a system are broken down into a 
surveillance envelope.  This envelope, shown in Figure 1, describes every possible combination 
of range-specific capabilities a system can possess and their relationship to one another (e.g., if a 
system can track IOIs then it is also by definition capable of detecting them).  As shown in 
Figure 1, a system can possess one, two, or all three range-specific capabilities.   
 
The notion of range-specific capabilities as they apply to surveillance systems can be applied to 
the broader notion of surveillance networks.  A surveillance network is one or more systems 
working within a single domain to maximize the surveillance capability of the systems within 
that domain.  In some cases there are multiple systems with identical range-specific capabilities 
(e.g., long-range radars augmented with short-range radars) while in other cases the network in 
place is layered with a variety of different systems (laser trip sensors that, when activated, tell 
                                                             
1
 This classification was based in part on contract between ICx and the General Services Administration. Some 
organizations use asset and equipment, others platform and sensors: 
General Services Administration Federal Supply Service Authorized Federal Supply Schedule Price List, Contract 
Number:GS-07F-0117U, U.S. General Services Administration, 2005. 
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camera to take a photo thereby providing detection and recognition of the IOI).  The greater the 
variety of range-specific capabilities a network (or system) possesses the more effective (and 
efficient) the organization employing that network can complete its mission.  
 
Figure 1: Range-specific surveillance envelope by Brandon Sanders. 
 
  
The Deficit of an Incomplete Network 
Ideally, a surveillance network is composed of systems that provide all three range-specific 
capabilities.  Unfortunately, most networks are far from ideal.  In the certain cases where funds 
are available to implement a layered network those funds are often used instead to increase the 
range of one or both of the other range-specific capabilities that network already possesses.  In 
some scenarios this is an acceptable and wise decision2.  In other scenarios the decision to do so 
does not result in a noticeable return on investment.  These resources would have been better 
spent on the acquisition of a different surveillance system or that of additional enforcement 
assets (the acquisition of either would assist in the completion of the overall mission).  However, 
there are instances in which one or two of the range-specific capabilities are unavailable, an 
unfortunate fact that has predictable consequences.   
 
If a surveillance network lacks the range-specific detection capability appropriate for that 
scenario, that network will first detect an IOI at a range that requires enforcement assets to 
scramble in response.  The act of scrambling will result in ill prepared and informed enforcement 
assets that will most likely not know the number, vector, velocity, or details (recognize) of the 
IOI they are intercepting.  Doing so wastes both time and money.  Insufficient tracking results in 
a similar outcome.  If an IOI is detected at long-range the enforcement assets dispatched to 
intercept it will have to do so based solely on the last known position of that IOI.  The failure to 
recognize an IOI has consequences not unlike those above.  
  
 
                                                             
2
 An example of this would be expanding a manned radar network from 350m to 1400m.  At 350m it is borderline 
possible to recognize an IOI with handheld optics, increasing the recognition capability would make no sense. 
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Exploring the Role and Importance of Recognition 
The Importance of Recognition 
The failure to provide adequate range-specific recognition has consequences similar to those 
described in the previous section (detection and tracking).  First, if recognition is lacking the 
enforcement assets responsible for enforcing the region under surveillance will be unaware of the 
intent or number of IOIs detected.  Since the operators of surveillance networks often send 
enforcement assets that are capable of overwhelming the IOI encountered, the number and 
capability of those assets may be inappropriate for the given scenario.  Doing so costs the 
operators time and money.  Second and even more important, it ties down enforcement assets 
that could otherwise be used to intercept additional IOI, IOI that were discovered only after 
detection of the first.  There is however a consequence unique to recognition, one that is unlike 
those from the previous chapter – the ability to discern whether or not an IOI is a false positive. 
Scenarios in which an IOI is inaccurately classified as a threat is an event commonly referred to 
as a false positive.  It is one thing to send too many enforcement assets in response to the 
detection of an IOI; it is something else entirely to dispatch those assets when the IOI detected is 
of no consequence whatsoever.  Doing so not only waste time and money, it leaves the operators 
extremely vulnerable to the use of decoys.  With this in mind, the capability to provide range-
specific recognition is the only way to determine with absolute certainty whether or not an IOI is 
a false positive.   
 
Surveillance Systems Incapable of Recognizing IOIs 
Despite the importance of recognition it is the most lacking of the three range-specific 
capabilities provided by modern surveillance networks.  This isn’t surprising given the fact that 
most large scale surveillance networks primary purpose is to track the IOIs they detect.  As is 
described by Figure 1, tracking requires detection but not recognition.  The most common 
systems used to detect and track IOIs are radars, thermal imagers, UAVs, and manned aircraft.  
Although some of these systems can be fitted with equipment that enables them to recognize 
IOIs, those systems outfitted to do so are the exception, not the rule.  One of the primary reasons 
existing networks lack the capability to recognize IOIs is the cost associated with doing so.  
Quite simply, it is less expensive to engage IOIs with overwhelming force that may or may not 
be necessary than it is to acquire and deploy systems capable of providing range-specific 
recognition. 
 
Resolving the Recognition Gap – The Portable Sensor System (PSS) 
Template of the PSS 
The PSS was designed to be a cost-effective system that fills the need for recognition that is 
endemic to many of the surveillance networks in use today.  The original concept of the PSS 
required that it meet the following criteria: 
 
• Portable 
• Mobile 
• Modular (and thereby upgradable) 
• Inexpensive 
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• Extensive use off the shelf parts (or slightly modified versions of them) and/or 
technology   
 
In addition to these criteria, the original concept called for the creation of a surveillance system 
which design was ‘entirely original’.  Entirely original means that both the operation (e.g., the 
way the system functions or works) and combination of components that make up the PSS had to 
be unique with respect to existing surveillance systems (e.g., the PSS could not provide 
recognition via the use of a spotlight and high-quality optics since systems like it already exists,).  
Originality also happened to be the most difficult criteria satisfy.  Whenever research uncovered 
a surveillance system whose design was similar to the PSS, the design of it had to be modified or 
altogether rethought.   
 
Final Design of the PSS 
The final design of the PSS uses a thermal camera for detection and tracking, a range finder to 
determine the range between the system and the IOI, a traditional still frame camera for imaging, 
a modified version of commercial flashlights to enable imaging at night, commercially available 
narrow band Wi-Fi for intra-system communications, and a commercial pan/tilt mechanism that 
enables horizontal and vertical rotation of the upper assembly (see Figure 2).  The mount on 
which this equipment rests contains the battery and a fully adjustable support system.  Fully 
assembled, the specifications of the PSS are (all dimensions are visible in Figures 2, 3, and 4): 
 
• Tall (dimension 1) 
• Diameter (dimension 2) 
• 13.5cm (5.3”) tall (dimension 3) 
• 19cm (7.5”) wide (dimension 4) 
• 27.9cm (11”) long/depth (dimension 5) (length does not include stakes which are 
removable)  
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The need for intra-system communication is a byproduct of the PSS’s design.  The specific 
implementation of this system is discussed in the next section.  For now the important thing to 
know is that the upper assembly is equipped with a narrow band transmitter while all of the 
flashlights are equipped with generic, off the shelf Wi-Fi receivers.  The thermal camera used in 
this design is an extremely low-end version of ones that are marketed to everyday citizens (e.g., 
FLIR First Mate II).  The final two components of the PSS are the battery and solar panels.  The 
specific type and size of battery used can vary depending on the operator’s needs.  The only 
restriction placed on the selection of a battery is that the battery must be capable of fitting in the 
main body of the lower assembly (the mount).  Solar panels are an option that extends the 
uninterrupted operation of the system; a capability that would likely appeal to those operators 
interested in surveillance systems capable of enduring long-term deployments.  
  
Deployment of the PSS 
When it is used as a standalone system the PSS is capable of detecting, tracking, and recognizing 
IOIs. However, when it is used in conjunction with other systems only one or two (depending the 
capabilities possessed by other systems in the network) of those capabilities are actually utilized.   
When operating as a standalone system, the engagement of IOIs is as follows: 
 
1. The thermal camera detects the heat signature indicative of an IOI  
2. The thermal camera tracks the IOI, using the pan and tilt mechanist to keep the IOI in the 
very center of the thermal cameras display 
3. As soon as the thermal camera begins to track the IOI, the laser rangefinder starts measuring 
the distance between the IOI and the PSS (the rangefinder is fixed to the upper assembly, 
directly below the thermal camera) 
4. The focus of the camera, which is located directly below the rangefinder, is adjusted so that it 
is constantly in focus.  This is accomplished by linking the focus of the camera to the 
distance measured by the range finder 
Steps 5 and 6 when the PSS is operating during the day: 
5. At a predetermined, user defined distance the camera takes a series of digital photographs 
(still frames, not video) 
6. These photographs are relayed to a local or regional command and control center (the type of 
communication equipment used depends on the needs of the operator) 
Steps 5 through 7 when the PSS is operating at night: 
7. At a predetermined, user defined distance the upper assembly broadcast a signal via 
narrowband Wi-Fi to all flashlights (both those on the PSS itself and those in the field) 
connected to that specific system telling them to turn on for a short period of time (usually 
between 1/5th and 1 second).   
8. The camera takes a series of digital photos a fraction of a second after the upper assembly 
tells the flashlights to turn on 
9. These photographs are relayed to a local or regional command and control center  
 
The PSS is capable of being deployed in three different configurations that vary depending on 
the location and number of flashlights deployed.  The three different configurations are: 
 
• Two or four flashlights mounted on the upper assembly, none in the field 
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• Two or four flashlights mounted on the upper assembly and any number of them 
deployed in the field 
• No flashlights mounted on the upper assembly, any number (at least two) of them 
deployed in the field 
 
The only time these configurations alter the surveillance capability of the PSS is at night, the 
daytime operation of the PSS is one dimensional regardless of the configuration or environment.  
Flashlights in the field are those that are staked to the ground, have their heads rotated 90o, and 
their Wi-Fi receiver extended (Figure 6).  The only drawback to this configuration is that it 
doesn’t guarantee that the light provided is focused on the IOI.  The amount of light that does 
reach the IOI depends on the location (relative to the flashlights) and vector of the IOI, the 
number of flashlights deployed, and the size of the region being lit up (the larger the region, the 
more difficult it is to illuminate).   
 
Each of the three configurations (Figure 7) has its benefits and drawbacks.  The first 
configuration has the shortest range but is also the most accurate.  Because the flashlights are 
fixed to the upper assembly they will always be pointed in the exact same direction as the 
camera, thermal camera, and rangefinder.  The only major drawback to using this configuration 
is that, because all the flash comes from a single source, it is easy to detect and more likely to be 
vandalized. 
 
The second configuration increases the range of the PSS and flashes the IOI from multiple 
directions.  This makes it harder for the IOI to detect the PSS all the while ensuring that at least 
some of the flash (that which comes from the flashlights mounted on the upper assembly) is 
directed towards the IOI.  The only downside to using this configuration is that the PSS is still 
vulnerable to detection, albeit less vulnerable than in the first configuration.  The capability of 
this configuration to recognize IOIs is improved significantly if four flashlights are mounted on 
the PSS.  The survivability of systems using this configuration are improved if all flashlights 
deployed in the field are done so in pairs.  Pairing two flashlights produces a greater flash (from 
a single point), making it more difficult to discern between the flash of the flashlights and that of 
the PSS.   
 
The third and final configuration has no flashlights mounted on the PSS.  This configuration 
makes it virtually impossible to locate the PSS at night and maximizes the range at which it can 
recognize IOIs (when using a preset number of flashlights).  The two downsides to using this 
configuration are: it is the least likely of the three to guarantee light is directed at the IOI and it 
requires more flashlights than the other two configurations combine (since it there is no flash on 
the PSS itself the light provided by the flashlights must be exceptional). 
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Figure 6: Flashlight  Figure 7: Configuration and deployment of the PSS
 
 
 
  
 
Shortcomings of the PSS 
The PSS was design to fulfill a very specific need, the need for recognition.  However, it is far 
from perfect.  The desire to build a low-cost system from off the shelf parts has consequences. 
The most obvious shortcoming is the vulnerability of the system to vandalism, particularly when 
it is deployed for an extended period in a remote location.  PSS networks that are not augmented 
with long-range detection equipment are only capable of tracking IOIs that are relatively close to 
the individual systems (400-450m).  If any of these IOIs spot one or more of the PSS systems 
they may choose to vandalize or destroy those systems.  Unfortunately, the remote location of 
these sensors means that enforcement assets will take a while to respond, quite possibly longer 
than it takes the vandals to flee the scene.   
 
PSS are also vulnerable to threats that attack from behind, even if the systems that make up that 
network are used in conjunction with long-range detection assets.  Fortunately the only scenario 
in which this vulnerability can be exploited is along border.  If the PSS is used in the defense of a 
perimeter (e.g., a military base, critical infrastructure, etc.) the only objects and personnel behind 
it are friendly.   
 
The second significant shortcoming of the PSS is that it is unable to recognize well in harsh 
atmospheric environments.  These environments include both inclement weather and 
atmospheric phenomena unrelated to the weather (e.g., sandstorms).  This is a serious weakness 
that well-informed threats can expose.  However, the PSS is not rendered entirely useless.  The 
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thermal camera and range finder enable the PSS to both detect and range IOI, useful capabilities 
when the PSS is deployed as a stand-alone system.  These capabilities are also useful if the PSS 
is used as a detection system that augments the detection capability of a larger, more system.  In 
this scenario the PSS is used to detect IOIs in terrain that cannot be monitored by the primary 
system, usually because that system is blinded by terrain that blocks its line of sight.    
 
Conclusion 
Work to be Done 
Prior to presenting at the conference additional work will be performed. This work includes 
changes to existing chapters, research that has been left out so as to meet the length requirements 
of this paper, and chapters/work that hasn’t yet been perform.  Some of the additional work and 
research presented at the conference includes:  
 
• The effect recognition has on the tactics used by surveillance organizations 
• Scenario-specific deployment of the PSS 
• Use of the Scenario-Specific Optimization of Surveillance Assets (SOSA) tool 
• Research into the resilience of the PSS when deployed in harsh environments 
• Cost of the system3 
 
Recognition is a significant range-specific capability integral to the proper functioning of any 
surveillance network, one that has been often been ignored by the operators of those networks.  It 
would be impractical and in some cases impossible to replace existing systems with ones capable 
of providing surveillance networks with the range-specific capabilities required by the operators 
on a scenario-by-scenario basis.  The PSS is a cost-effective system that has the potential, when 
used to augment existing systems, to meet these requirements. 
 
                                                             
3
 Early estimates suggest that a single system with four flashlights will cost between $7,000 and $12,000. 
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